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I. INTRODUCTION
It was a cold winter night.' Bobby Smoltz was returning after a long
day of skiing. He was tired and had hurt his leg on the slopes. He had
also drunk beer and smoked several joints while skiing. As Smoltz was
on his way home, something about the way he was driving caught the
eye of Officer Bret Maddux. Maddux pulled his squad car behind
Smoltz's 1985 Toyota 4-Runner and followed him for several miles.
Eventually, Smoltz's truck crossed over the centerline while turning a
corner. At that point, Maddux initiated a traffic stop because he sus-
pected that Smoltz was driving under the influence of intoxicants.
2
As Maddux approached the truck, he smelled an overwhelming
odor of marijuana emanating from the driver's window. Upon looking in,
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1. The facts of this story are based on a recent police report (on file with author). At the request
of the parties involved with the incident, all identifying names and references in the report have been
redacted and kept confidential. In other words, as the old television show Dragnet used to say, "The
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Maddux believed that Smoltz was stoned. He asked Smoltz for his
driver's license, and after observing Smoltz fumble around, Maddux
asked Smoltz to get out of his car for some standard field sobriety tests.
Subsequently, Maddux turned on his patrol car's video camera. The
video of the stop showed that Smoltz performed comparatively well on
the standard field sobriety tests, although he frequently complained about
his hurt leg. Still, something did not feel right to Maddux and he decided
to probe further. Maddux asked Smoltz if he had consumed any alcohol
or taken any other drugs earlier that day. Smoltz admitted that he had
drunk some beer and had smoked some marijuana with his friends while
he was up on the mountain. Based on this admission and Maddux's train-
ing and experience, Maddux placed Smoltz under arrest for driving under
the influence of intoxicants. This is where the story really becomes
interesting.
After Smoltz was cuffed and placed in the back of the patrol car,
Maddux asked for permission to search the vehicle. Smoltz, perhaps real-
izing the consequences of his earlier admissions, smartly declined. When
Maddux asked, "Why not?," Smoltz responded, "Because I do not want
you to!"
Nonetheless, Maddux pressed on. He said, "I still have to perform
an inventory search of the vehicle. Is there anything I am going to find
during that inventory search that you want to tell me about?" Smoltz ca-
pitulated: "Well, I do have about four or five ounces of pot in my duffel
bag." 3
Sure enough, when Maddux performed his "inventory search" of
the truck, he found eight Ziploc bags containing one-half pound of mari-
juana each.4 He also found $667.00 in cash. The truck was towed, and
Maddux took Smoltz to jail on charges of possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute, manufacturing a controlled substance,
and driving under the influence of a controlled substance.
Inventory searches are warrantless searches that are not investiga-
tory in scope and are not intended to be searches for evidence.5 Thus, this
3. At this point, Officer Maddux most likely had probable cause to search the car, thanks to
Smoltz's statements. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
4. It is theoretically possible that Officer Maddux may have been able to search the car as a
search incident to arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see also New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). This article will ignore that possibility and focus mainly on the inven-
tory search or threat of an inventory search, as some officers and police departments now avoid
searches of automobiles incident to arrest in favor of inventories. Additionally, in his police report
Officer Maddux referred to his search as an inventory search, although, as this Comment will dem-
onstrate, it clearly did not meet the requirements for an inventory search. Even so, Officer Maddux
probably performed a legal search here and was justified in doing so. See supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 366-71 (1976).
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story raises an interesting problem: whether Officer Maddux abused the
inventory search procedure by going beyond the scope permitted by law.
Inventory searches usually occur whenever a car is impounded.6
Generally, when performing an inventory search, police are looking to
find either valuables or dangerous items before the vehicle is towed.7 The
purpose of an inventory search is to protect the vehicle owner's property
while it is in police custody and control, protect the police from dishon-
est claims of theft, and protect officers and the community from poten-
tially dangerous situations. 8 These three reasons make inventory searches
a useful procedure that the police should continue to use.9
However, just as inventory searches are useful, helpful procedures,
the inventory search doctrine itself is immersed in problems.10 Some of
these problems stem from the fact that the public has little or no knowl-
edge of the procedure or its intended use.) This is easily demonstrated
by Smoltz, who initially refused a general evidentiary search and then
made incriminating statements because he did not understand the limita-
tions on the inventory search or what it entailed. If the public is generally
ignorant regarding inventory searches, it is also possible that there is a
lack of knowledge about the procedure among police, lawyers, and even
6. See, e.g., SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICES AND
PROCEDURES: AUDIT, ACCREDITATION AND POLICY SECTION § 2.089, at VI (2006) [hereinafter
SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT], available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/police/Publications/
SPD%20Manualv 1_1 .pdf (mandating an inventory search in non-investigatory situations); DOUGLAS
COUNTY [OREGON] SHERIFF'S OFFICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION PROCEDURES § 415 (2001) [hereinafter
DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE] (requiring an inventory search whenever a vehicle is towed).
While it is possible to perform an inventory search of a person, as in the case of a jail-booking, see
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), this Comment will focus on vehicle inventory searches.
Some of the cases discussed in this Comment will involve personal inventory searches, however, as
many of the issues are the same.
7. See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 366-71.
8. Id. at 369.
9. One court praised and described the procedure as follows: "We note that there was no intent
to discover evidence of a crime. Rather this was responsible, indeed laudable, police conduct to
protect the property of the owner of a lawfully impounded car. If valuable property had been left on
the seat and floor of the car, plainly visible to anyone peering through the window, the danger of
theft would have been substantial. Not surprisingly, it appears that [inventory searches] are standard
procedures. They certainly should be." United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1972).
10. See e.g., infra Parts 11I, V.
11. As one commentator notes:
Accumulating empirical evidence suggests that public knowledge of the law is embar-
rassingly low .... One can speculate that people learn the criminal law, or what they
think is the criminal law, not from the criminal code, but from friends and family, per-
sonal experience, and traditional sources of public information such as schools, newspa-
pers, news magazines, and television.
Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1994) (cita-
tions omitted). "Public knowledge of criminal law is low. What people do learn they learn from
sources other than the code and commonly is wrong." Id. at 199.
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judges.12 This Comment will demonstrate that even for those who under-
stand inventory searches, the rules are hopelessly inconsistent and
difficult to apply in practice. 13 Such ambiguity leads to an even greater
problem: police have the ability to use the procedure to manipulate sus-
pects. Consequently, inventory searches run the risk of not serving their
benevolent policy concerns, but instead acting as a "safety net" in cases
where an evidentiary search is impossible.
4
Thus, to ensure that inventory searches continue to serve their use-
ful, intended purpose, courts should abandon their reliance on "reason-
able police procedure," and instead adopt clear, bright line rules that
define a broad scope for inventory searches, yet require police to obtain
consent and to honor a refusal of an inventory search. Part II of this
Comment will describe the inventory search as it has developed in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in order to provide background and un-
derstanding of the procedure as it stands today. Part III will address the
difficulties in applying the Supreme Court's approach by comparing the
differences in police department policies. Part IV will then closely exam-
ine Washington's somewhat laudable approach to inventory searches, the
limits the state has placed on the scope of inventory searches, and the
steps the state has taken to impose a consent requirement. Last, Part V
will suggest much needed reforms for Washington and the rest of the
nation to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected while inven-
tory searches continue to serve their purpose.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INVENTORY SEARCH DOCTRINE
The inventory search doctrine that has been followed or adapted by
many states15 was developed by the Supreme Court in four major cases.16This Part will begin with a general discussion of standard inventory
12. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A, which briefly discusses how in State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d.
143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980), the Washington Supreme Court misstated the inventory rule as it had
been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
13. See infra Part III.
14. While preparing this Comment, a government attorney, who has asked to remain anony-
mous, expressed concern to the author that more and more police are threatening suspects with an
eventual inventory search in order to obtain consent for evidentiary searches, "which," he went on to
say sarcastically, "I find cute." See also Alexander E. Eismann, Note, Addressing the Pretext Prob-
lem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63
B.U. L. REv. 223 (1983) (describing ways in which police use various procedures in order to per-
form evidentiary searches that would otherwise be improper).
15. See, e.g., People v. Benites, II Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Stalder, 438
N.W.2d 498 (Neb. 1989); State v. Hathman, 604 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1992); Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143,
622 P.2d 1218.
16. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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search rules. Then, in order to provide a greater understanding of inven-
tory search procedure, how the doctrine developed, and its policy
implications, this Part will discuss the four major cases: South Dakota v.
Opperman,17 Illinois v. Lafayette,18 Colorado v. Bertine,19 and Florida v.
Wells.20 While examining those cases, this Part will also analyze their
implications, strengths, and shortcomings.
Any discussion of search and seizure procedure begins with the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It provides as follows: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ... ,, This
Amendment requires that a warrant be issued before a search takes place,
and consequently, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and un-
constitutional.22 The point of the warrant requirement is that the decision
to search should be made "by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime. 2 3
Although warrantless searches are considered per se unreasonable,
where there is a danger to law enforcement officers or when evidence
could be lost or destroyed, the Court has allowed for "a few 'jealously
24and carefully drawn' exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Other
exceptions to the warrant requirement include cases where police are not
searching for evidence, but are merely performing a "community care-
taking function. 25 It follows that the inventory search doctrine is an ex-
ception because police are not searching for evidence but are performing
this "community caretaking function" and protecting themselves from
dishonest claims of theft.26 If police do find contraband during the course
of a lawfully performed and seemingly benevolent inventory search, then
that evidence will be admissible at trial. 27 Additionally, although inven-
tory searches take place without a warrant, they are in fact "searches"
17. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
18. 462 U.S. 640.
19. 479 U.S. 367.
20. 495 U.S. 1.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948).
23. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
24. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493,499 (1958)).
25. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
26. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69.
27. See, e.g., id. at 369-71 (where evidence obtained from an inventory search was admissible
against the defendant).
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and are considered
reasonable.28
Vehicle inventory searches can occur in a variety of situations and
they almost always occur after a vehicle is impounded by the police.29
For example, an inventory search usually happens when a vehicle is im-
pounded where the driver is arrested for driving while intoxicated or
driving with a suspended license.30 In cases where a traffic stop is in-
volved, for the inventory search to be valid, the stop itself must be
valid.3' Many times, inventory searches also occur when there is no stop,
no suspect is present, and police are merely impounding an illegally
parked or abandoned vehicle.32 Here again, in order for the search to be
valid, the impound of the car must also be valid.33 Thus, to understand
how these rules developed and their current problems, it is helpful to
examine the cases that have created them.
A. South Dakota v. Opperman 34 Describes the Modern
Inventory Search Standard and Creates Modern Problems
The Supreme Court firmly established the inventory search excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in South Dakota v. Opperman,5 which
held that inventory searches are valid so long as they are performed ac-
cording to reasonable police procedure. 36 In Opperman, a car was ille-
gally parked in a downtown area and received two parking citations.
37
The car was eventually towed to the city impound lot where an officer
noticed a wristwatch as well as some other personal items through the
28. For a more detailed discussion of whether inventory searches are really "searches," see 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.4 (4th
ed. 2004).
29. See sources cited supra note 6. The only time when a vehicle inventory search would not
occur following an impound would be when the police were trying to secure the vehicle before leav-
ing it in a remote area. See, e.g., State v. Stalder, 438 N.W.2d 498 (Neb. 1989).
30. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (defendant was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol); United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (defendant was
stopped for speeding and later arrested on drug charges); People v. Benites, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant's car was towed because he was driving with a suspended license);
State v. Hathman, 604 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1992) (defendant arrested on suspicion of stealing the car
he was driving); State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (defendant was stopped for
running a traffic sign; his car was impounded and inventoried because he was driving without a
license).
31. State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 147-48, 622 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980).
32. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 365-67 (1976).
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id. at 364.
35. Id. at 372.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 365-66.
1036 [Vol. 30:1031
The Vehicle Inventory Search Doctrine
car's window.38 Concerned about the safety of the valuables inside the
car, the officer entered and searched the vehicle. Pursuant to his depart-
ment's procedures, 39 he performed the search while noting the items he
found on a standard inventory form.40 Upon opening the car's glove box,
the officer found marijuana.4' When the car's owner eventually appeared
to claim his property, he was arrested and charged with unlawful posses-
sion of a controlled substance.42
While the Opperman Court created a rule permitting inventory
searches, this rule had many problems.43 According to the Court, war-
rantless vehicle inventory searches are valid when they follow reasonable
"standard police procedures. ' 44 However, the Court failed to describe
just what those "standard police procedures" were.45 Instead, it simply
claimed that there were procedures "prevailing throughout the country
and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts."4 Unfortunately,
in making this statement the Court failed to cite a single court that also
approved of a clear, uniform "standard procedure" used throughout the
country.47 Additionally, the Court failed to define the proper scope of an
inventory search or address whether or not consent was required to per-
form the search. 48 As a consequence, "standard police procedures," as
defined by individual law enforcement agencies across the country,
solely define the limits of an inventory search because the Court did not
establish a clear rule.49
By contrast, the policy reasons behind allowing inventory searches
under the Opperman rule were clear.50 The purpose of allowing the ex-
ception was threefold: (1) protecting private property while it remained
in police custody; (2) protecting the police against claims or disputes
over lost or stolen property; and (3) protecting the police and public from
38. Id at 366.
39. Id. at 366.
40. An inventory form is used to record the various items found during an inventory search.
See, e.g., id. at 380 n.6.
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 385-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
45. Although, a description of the procedures that the Vermillion, South Dakota Police
Department used was given. See id. at 380 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 376. As this Comment will demonstrate, the procedures are anything but uniform and
lead to some fantastically inconsistent results.
47. In the court's defense, it did cite to state courts that approved of inventory searches gener-
ally. See id at 371 (majority opinion).
48. Id. at 385-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 372 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 369.
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potential danger.5' Of these three reasons, the third has been most subject
to criticism. 52 One noted commentator on Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence said that the protection from danger rationale "borders on the ri-
diculous. ' 53 Even so, while the danger to the police and public seems
minimal, there still exists the possibilities of bombs or booby-traps that
could be hidden in a vehicle that is about to be impounded.5 4 With to-
day's increased fears of terrorism and suicide bombers, the third ration-
ale may have some credibility left; however, if police have probable
cause to believe a car is a serious danger, then performing a regular
evidentiary search would not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.55 Fur-
thermore, even when the police believe a person, place, or vehicle is
potentially dangerous, nothing prevents them from searching in violation
of the Fourth Amendment-the exclusionary rule would simply prevent
any evidence discovered from being introduced at trial.56
Opperman was a plurality decision, and the dissenters criticized the
Court's policy justifications of protection of property, protection from
dishonest claims, and protection of public safety.57 However, the dissent-
ing justices also had the foresight to point out things that would become
issues in later cases, namely the issues of consent and containers.58 In
Opperman, the officer looked in a glove compartment during the inven-
tory search.59 In his dissent, Justice Marshall questioned whether the of-
ficer should have been allowed to continue had the glove box been
locked. 60 Additionally, he questioned whether or not the police should
have been required to obtain the defendant's consent before performing
the search.6' The issue of consent has yet to be definitively resolved, es-
pecially in Washington, and it poses a special problem in cases like
Opperman, where the vehicle owner is not present at the time that the car
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 770 n.9, 958 P.2d 982, 986 (1998); 3 LAFAVE, supra
note 28, at § 7.4(a); Steven M. Christenson, Comment, Colorado v. Bertine Opens the Inventory
Search to Containers, 73 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1988).
53. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 28, at § 7.4(a).
54. See Christenson, supra note 52, at 786 n.140. However, as the court in United States v.
Cooper said, "No sane individual inspects for booby-traps by opening a container." 428 F. Supp.
652, 654-55 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
55. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 28, at § 7.4(a).
56. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule announced in
Weeks was applied to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
57. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 389-92 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
58. Id. at 385.
59. Id. at 366 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 385 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Idat 385.
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is impounded.62 Despite this controversy, Opperman has become the es-
tablished rule regarding inventory searches and has been followed by
many states.63
B. The Doctrine is Refined in Illinois v. Lafayette,64 and the Need for
Uniform Standards of Police Procedure is Established
Seven years after Opperman, the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of inventory searches to include containers, such as luggage and
briefcases, and affirmed the need for a clear, uniform standard.65 In Illi-
nois v. Lafayette, the Court applied the Opperman rationale to inventory
66searches of the person. There, the defendant was arrested for disturbing
the peace and was taken to jail.67 During the booking process, he was
ordered to empty his pockets and his bag was searched. 68 The search
yielded amphetamine pills hidden inside a cigarette case package. 69 The
Lafayette Court acknowledged that the police have a right to make a full
and complete search of a person following a lawful custodial arrest.7°
However, the Court distinguished routine administrative inventory
searches from investigatory searches based on probable cause because of
the need to protect safety and the inmate's property.7' Once again, the
Court relied on the Opperman policy justifications in order to support the
use of inventory searches in this context.
72
Lafayette is important for two reasons. First, it was here that the
Court began to expand the scope of inventory searches to containers.73
Second, the Court applied an oft-quoted phrase to inventory search doc-
trine: "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers,
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront., 74 Many commentators have agreed that a "single familiar
standard" is needed for inventory searches and police procedure in
62. See discussion infra Parts IV, V.B.
63. See, e.g., People v. Benites, II Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hathman,
604 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1992); State v. Atkinson, 688 P.2d 832 (Or. 1984).
64. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
65. Id. at 642, 647-48.
66. Id. Again, while this Comment focuses on vehicle inventory searches, some of the juris-
prudence relating to personal inventory searches is relevant.
67. Id. at 641.
68. Id. at 641-42.
69. Id. at 642.
70. Id. at 644-45 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
71. Id. at 646.
72. Id. at 643, 647.
73. Id. at 642, 647-48 (although the search occurred in the context of a jail-booking and the
items were on the defendant's person, containers were still involved).
74. Id. at 648 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
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general; yet, few, if any, have suggested what it should be or how to
achieve it.75 Quizzically, the Court contradicted itself in making this
statement.76 Immediately prior to affirming the need for a single stan-
dard, the Court said that it was not in a place to second-guess police de-
partments in the policies they set and that departments should be entitled
to set policies based on their administrative needs.77 While the Court
attempted to create a singular, national rule to define the scope of inven-
tory searches, it actually created a fragmented and inconsistent rule by
continuing to rely on the policies of individual agencies.
C. Colorado v. Bertine 78 Opens the Door to Container Searches and
Allows for Greater Inconsistencies Among Different Search Policies
After Lafayette allowed for container searches when performing an
inventory of a person prior to booking, Colorado v. Bertine extended the
rule to allow for container searches when performing an inventory of a
vehicle. 79 In Bertine, the defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol. 80 The arresting officer called to have the defen-
dant's van towed and impounded.' While waiting for the tow truck to
arrive, two officers performed an inventory search of the van, in which
they discovered a backpack.82 Upon opening the backpack, they found
drugs, cocaine paraphernalia, and lots of cash.83 After the Colorado
Supreme Court struck down the search as violating the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari; the issue
on appeal was whether entering the backpack was beyond the scope of an
inventory search.84
Relying on Lafayette, the Bertine Court held that the police legally
searched the defendant's backpack.85 Here again, the rule from
75. See James W. Hilliard, A "Single Familiar Standard": Warrantless Vehicle Inventory
Searches, 82 ILL. B.J. 370 (1994) (demonstrating the difficulty in applying different police proce-
dures and arguing for a uniform one); Christenson, supra note 52 (arguing for a different bright line
rule for containers than the one established by the Supreme Court). See generally Wayne R. LaFave,
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith', 43 U.
PITT. L. REv. 307 (1982) (reaffirming Professor LaFave's support of clear bright line rules and repu-
diating the way that the Supreme Court has quoted him and applied its own form of bright line
rules).
76. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648.
77. Id.
78. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
79. Id. at 374-75.
80. Id. at 368.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 368-69.
83. Id. at 369.
84. Id. at 370-71.
85. Id. at 372-76.
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Opperman was applied: so long as police follow "reasonable regula-
tions," an inventory search will be upheld as valid "even though courts
might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules
requiring a different procedure. 86 However, as in Lafayette, the Bertine
Court reaffirmed the need for "a single familiar standard," but did not
define that standard.8 7 Apparently, the Court reasoned that the single fa-
miliar standard was satisfied so long as the police were following their
own established guidelines. 88 In Bertine, the police department's policy
mandated the officers to open every container they found during an
inventory search. 89 Because the officers were following that policy, the
inventory search was valid.90 Also, having dispensed with the idea in
Opperman, the Bertine Court completely failed to address the issue of
consent.91
The Bertine rule has been criticized for giving officers broad scope
and discretion. As he did in Opperman and Lafayette, Justice Marshall
dissented.92 Among his more stinging points, Justice Marshall argued
that the purpose of relying on police procedure was to limit officer dis-
cretion, and the procedure in Bertine allowed officers the choice of
whether or not to impound a vehicle and inventory it.93 Additionally,
Marshall pointed out factual difficulties in the case where the officers
were not actually performing an inventory search but were instead
searching for evidence.94 For instance, the officer in charge of the search
easily found the drug contraband and noted it on the inventory form, but
he failed to note the defendant's wallet or rent money.
95
Scholarly criticism of Bertine has seriously questioned whether
searches of containers serve the purposes of the inventory search.96 Some
scholars argue that this case established a "bright line" rule allowing con-
tainer searches.97 However, this case actually gave police the option to
establish "reasonable" policies allowing container searches, which leads
to strange and inconsistent results. 98 Nonetheless, some claim that
86. Id. at 374.
87. Id. at 375.
88. See id. at 372-76.
89. Id. at 374 n.6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 368-76 (nowhere does the majority mention consent).
92. Id. at 377-87.
93. Id. at 379-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 383.
95. Id.
96. See, Christenson, supra note 52.
97. Id. at 783.
98. See discussion infra Part 1II.
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Bertine should be overturned in order to better protect people's privacy. 99
The opinion is unclear as to whether container searches actually further
the policies underlying the inventory search doctrine and whether
consent should play a role in the ability to refuse such a container search.
Unfortunately, the inconsistencies that arise by allowing police agencies
to set their own policies regarding container searches have not been
corrected.
D. Florida v. Wells'0 0 Ensures that Inconsistent Search
Policies With Regard to Scope and Consent Will Continue
The confusing rule announced in Bertine'°  reappeared in Florida v.
Wells, 10 2 which reaffirmed that opening containers would be valid if a
police department policy authorized it.'0 3 In Wells, the defendant was
pulled over for speeding and was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol.'14 He was informed by the arresting officer that his car would
be towed and inventoried. 10 5 The defendant then consented to a search of
the car's trunk. 0 6 Police completed a full inventory search at the police
impound facility, and found the butts of two joints in the ashtray.107 The
defendant's suitcase, which was found in the trunk, was opened to reveal
a garbage bag filled with marijuana. 10 8 The defendant was charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 0 9 The Florida Supreme
Court suppressed the evidence as fruits of an illegal search because, rely-
ing on Bertine, the police had no "policy specifically requiring the open-
ing of closed containers found during a legitimate inventory search." '" 0
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court, but on slightly
different grounds."' While the Florida court suppressed the evidence
because the police did not have a clear policy requiring the opening of
containers, the Supreme Court said that police policy need only authorize
officers to open containers at their own discretion for container searches
to be valid." 12 Thus, since the police in this case had a policy that did not
99. See Christenson, supra note 52.
100. 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
101. 479 U.S. at 374.
102. 495 U.S. 1.
103. Id. at 4.




108. 490 U.S. 1 (1990).
109. Id.
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even mention containers, the search of the suitcase was found invalid. 13
Of course, like Bertine, this rule encourages some strange results: if po-
lice have an "open-the-container" policy, then container inventory
searches are valid; if not, then they are invalid." 14
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in
the judgment only, and Justice Brennan wrote an opinion criticizing the
Court on the same issues that were present in Opperman, Lafayette, and
Bertine.115 The majority completely abandoned the idea that standardized
police procedures should be used to limit police discretion, not expand
it. 116 Additionally, the Court once again ignored its own call for a "single
familiar standard."' '
17
Seventeen years after the decision in Wells, the Court has yet to re-
examine its position on inventory searches. The doctrine has developed
to a point where it is unclear whether the Court has established a bright
line rule or something else entirely. While the Court may claim that it has
established a clear, bright line rule, 1 8 bright line application has been
abandoned for a case-by-case approach. As one circuit court stated, "The
central inquiry in determining whether such an inventory search is
reasonable is a consideration of the totality of the circumstances." ' 19 Cer-
tainly, a totality of the circumstances approach to searches is fundamen-
tally opposed to the concept of bright line rules. 120 Although courts have
been analyzing inventory search policies under a totality of the circum-
stances approach, 121 there have been repeated calls for a single, uniform
standard with a bright line rule that is easy for police to apply in the
field. 22 If lower courts are applying a totality of the circumstances
approach in evaluating police actions under inventory search jurispru-
dence, 123 then the Supreme Court has failed in its attempt to create a
113. Id. at 4-5.
114. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374; Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5.
115. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 5-10, (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 7-8.
117. Id. at 9.
118. See discussion supra Parts I1.C, lI.D.
119. United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mar-
shall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1993)).
120. For instance, Black's Law Dictionary defines a bright line rule as "[a] legal rule of deci-
sion that tends to resolve issues, esp. ambiguities, simply and straightforwardly, sometimes sacrific-
ing equity for certainty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). By contrast, the totality of the
circumstances approach examines the entire situation, and the court makes a "common sense judg-
ment." Id.
121. See Hartje, 251 F.3d at 774; Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171. See also Wells, 495 U.S. 1; Colo-
rado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
122. See Wells, 495 U.S. 1; Bertine 479 U.S. 367; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
See also Hilliard, supra note 75.
123. As in Hartje, 251 F.3d at 771.
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clear, bright line rule. This failure has led to difficulties in applying the
rule and inconsistent policies nationwide.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE CURRENT INVENTORY SEARCH
DOCTRINE AND THE RESULTING INCONSISTENT POLICIES
The inventory search standard developed by the Supreme Court is
difficult to apply because it requires a two-step analysis, relying in part
on police policies that can vary from place to place. 124 A simple, clear,
truly bright line standard should be adopted that will allow police to
apply the rule in pressure situations, allow the bench and bar to easily
analyze inventory searches in litigation, and allow the public an easier
understanding of its rights. This Part will discuss the difficulties of ap-
plying the current standard, will compare two policies from different law
enforcement agencies in different states, and will end with a discussion
of the importance of a uniform standard of procedure for inventory
searches.
As described in Part II, an inventory search will be upheld if police
were following an established standard policy or procedure that is rea-
sonable. 125 The difficulty with this rule is knowing what exactly the po-
lice procedure is and knowing what is considered "reasonable." Another
difficulty is the lack of public knowledge surrounding the inventory
search procedure, because few people know what policies the police
actually follow.
126
Public knowledge of police policy and procedure is lacking, in part,
because law enforcement agencies do not like to release policies and
procedures to the general public. 127 However, a contributing factor to the
lack of public knowledge may be a lack of public interest in learning the
policies. Certainly, no one128 wants to spend their Saturday reading a
124. See discussion infra Part III.B.
125. See discussion supra Part II.
126. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 11 ("public knowledge of the law is embarrassingly low").
To test this idea, one must ask oneself if he or she knew of this procedure and the policies surround-
ing it prior to reading this Comment. If so, do one's non-lawyer and non-police friends know what
inventory searches are and that they routinely take place without a warrant? See also Myron Mosk-
ovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 657, 663 (discussing the difficulties of obtaining police policies and procedures, partly be-
cause police procedures are exempted under FOIA).
127. The policies are not always readily available. See Moskovitz, supra note 126. However, in
the author's experience, some departments were willing to give a copy of the policies to anyone who
called. This is the case with the Washington State Patrol, who posts many of their forms and publica-
tions online and also provides contact information for those seeking to obtain other polices which are
not posted. WASHINGTON STATE PATROL, RECORDS AND REPORTS, http://www.wa.gov/wsp/
reports/reports.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). The Seattle Police Department is bucking the trend
by posting its entire police procedure manual online in PDF format, supra note 6.
128. Except, perhaps, a few professors, students, and law review members.
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somewhat dry police policy manual. However, when one's car is about to
be towed by the police and there are personal, private items in it, inven-
tory search policies immediately become more important. Even some
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and perhaps judges have probably never
looked up a police search policy until they faced the threat of an impend-
ing hearing. Thus, it seems prudent to describe some of the police search
policies that presently exist.
A. A Comparison of Two Different Inventory Search Policies
The current inventory search doctrine, as developed through
Opperman, Lafayette, Bertine, and Wells, encourages different and in-
consistent policies to flourish among different jurisdictions. As a result,
there is no uniform procedure prevailing throughout the nation.129 It is
entirely possible that there could be two different, valid policies which
vary drastically in scope, such as one where opening containers is ap-
proved and another where opening containers is not approved. 130 Like-
wise, there could be two different, valid policies where one allows for
significant officer discretion and the other significantly curtails it. 131
Given a possible lack of public knowledge about the law1 32 and these
possible differences, a comparison between two policies is necessary.
1. Douglas County, Oregon
A good example of the typical inventory search policy under the
Supreme Court's standard comes from Douglas County, Oregon. The
Douglas County Sheriff's Office has an inventory policy that specifically
relies on the Opperman policy justifications. 133 It states:
The procedure is intended to:
1. Insure the protection of the owner's property.
2. Reduce the assertion of false claims against officers or other per-
sons for lost, stolen or damaged property.
3. Reduce the danger to the deputies and the public that may arise
from the towing and storage of un-inventoried 3froperty, i.e., haz-
ardous chemicals, explosives, and firearms, etc.'
The policy goes on to require that deputies inventory the entire ve-
hicle before it is towed, "including the glove compartment, spaces under
129. See discussion supra Part II.
130. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1990).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 11.
133. DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, supra note 6.
134. Id.
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the seats and trunk of the vehicle." 135 Deputies arie directed to list all of
the vehicle's contents on a tow slip, noting any locked compartments,
and they are prohibited from opening closed containers until the case has
been reviewed by the District Attorney. 136 This is a model policy under
the Opperman standard. 37 It clearly lays out the deputy's responsibilities
and the scope of the search, it mentions closed containers and limits dep-
uty discretion in opening them, and it makes clear to the deputy that the
purpose of the search is not to find evidence. Still, it should be noted that
this policy does little to protect whatever privacy concerns or consent
issues that may be present in an inventory search: once a subject's car is
impounded, most of what is there is fair game for the search.
138
2. City of Seattle, Washington
By contrast, the Seattle Police Department's policy is a little less
clear, but it provides greater privacy protections to the vehicle owner.'
39
In Seattle, police are empowered with discretion in deciding whether to
impound a vehicle. 140 This type of discretion was a problem at issue in
the dissent of Bertine14 1 and concurrence of Wells. 14 2 When making the
determination of whether or not to do an inventory search, however,
Seattle police are specifically told not to inventory the car if there is rea-
son to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. 43 This is a
good way of safeguarding potential evidence from the reaches of the ex-
clusionary rule' 44 because it completely divorces inventory searches from
evidentiary searches. However, even if a vehicle is placed on an "inves-
tigatory hold" by a Seattle police officer, an inventory search may still be
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Compare South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
138. See DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, supra note 6.
139. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at §§ 2.065, 2.089. The greater privacy
protections are probably due, in part, to the Washington courts' approach to inventory searches,
discussed infra Part IV.
140. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at § 2.089.
141. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377-87 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. According to the Seattle police,
Officers shall make a routine inspection of an impounded vehicle for items of value,
unless the vehicle is impounded on an investigatory hold. Absent exigent circumstances,
consent, or some other legal authority, nothing in this section shall be construed to au-
thorize a search or seizure of a vehicle without a warrant where a warrant would other-
wise be required.
SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at § 2.089(VI)(A).
144. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). See also supra note 56.
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performed in the absence of a warrant. 145 In such cases, the search is per-
formed by "Criminal Investigations personnel" who are limited from
opening the trunk or any locked containers. 146
3. Comparison
While the Seattle Police Department's inventory policy has some
innovative, positive features to it, what it lacks is clear direction for the
officer, especially with regard to scope. 147 Officers are merely directed to
"make a routine inspection" upon impound and are not directed to list the
contents of the vehicle as in the Douglas County policy. 148 Additionally,
Seattle officers are not told whether they should open containers when
performing an inventory on cars that do not have an investigatory hold.
149
This ambiguity and lack of direction will create problems if the policy is
ever called into question in a courtroom.
The differences between the Douglas County and the Seattle Police
Department inventory policies are quite stark.1 50 Although these two
policies come from different states, the Supreme Court in Opperman as-
sumed that "standard police procedures prevail[ed] throughout the coun-
try and [were] approved by the overwhelming majority of courts."'151 As
these two policies and the cases 15 2 above demonstrate, no such uniform
standard procedure existed, and different departments have different in-
ventory search rules that may vary drastically in scope.
153
B. The Importance of Having a Uniform Standard
A uniform standard is needed because the law values consistency
and the public should be able to know what to expect. As it stands now,
different law enforcement policies will likely produce different results.
Inventory policies, and thus what would be found following a lawful im-
pound, change not only from state to state, but from county to county and
145. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at § 2.065(II)(F).
146. Id.
147. Id. at § 2.089(VI).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. It is also helpful to compare the policies of other departments. Some of the cases address-
ing inventory searches have quoted or described police policies. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 380 n.4 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 380
n.6, n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
152. See discussion supra Part II.
153. For a good discussion demonstrating the importance and need of a "single familiar stan-
dard," see Hilliard, supra note 75.
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city to city. 5 4 A person arrested for drunk driving in one city might also
be charged with possession of a controlled substance in that city, where
if he was stopped a few miles up the road, an inventory search would
yield no evidence of another crime. While laws and policies may change
from one jurisdiction to another, a person's privacy expectations possibly
do not.
The Supreme Court's purpose in initially relying on police proce-
dures was to limit officer discretion. 155 However, as the dissenters in La-
fayette and Bertine pointed out,156 the way the rule has developed has
actually increased police discretion when performing inventory searches.
It is, in fact, police departments themselves who set inventory search
policies, which alone gives police the power and discretion in determin-
ing the scope and rules of the search.
One example of the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's stan-
dard is in the area of container searches. As noted in Part II, following
Wells, 157 agencies whose policies allowed container searches would have
that evidence admitted at trial, where others that did not allow such
searches would have the evidence excluded at trial. 158 As -the Douglas
County and Seattle Police examples demonstrate, the policies that exist
today are actually quite far from the "single familiar standard" desired
for in Lafayette. "9
Aside from inconsistencies, the current standard creates another
problem-it is difficult for police, lawyers, and judges to apply. 160 The
current piecemeal standard requires a step-by-step analysis.' 16 First, a
court must determine whether or not the officer was following the estab-
lished policy. 62 Second, it must be determined if that policy is
154. See discussion supra Parts II.C, I.D. See also discussion supra Part III.A. Policies could
even be different when stopped at the same place, depending on the law enforcement agency in-
volved. Different agencies, such as city police, county sheriffs, and state patrols often share concur-
rent jurisdiction over the same area.
155. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374-75 (when discussing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973), "[t]he Court carefully noted that the protective search was carried out in accordance with
standard procedures in the local police department ... a factor tending to ensure that the intrusion
would be limited in scope").
156. See discussion supra Parts JI.B, II.C.
157. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1995). See discussion supra Part II.D.
158. To further complicate things, container searches of the person are always allowed upon
jail-booking. So, if a container was not searched in the vehicle inventory, hut the suspect brought it
to jail with them, it would be searched eventually. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
159. See discussion supra, Part III.A.
160. The application requires a complicated, two step analysis. See discussion infra, Part III.B.
See also Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
161. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
162. Id.
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"reasonable." 163 While determining whether or not the officer was fol-
lowing policy is a relatively simple analysis, analyzing reasonableness is
anything but. In doing so, a court must make a subjective, case-by-case
analysis of the policy anytime it is challenged. 64 Thus, a court is not ask-
ing whether the officer's actions were reasonable, as it would be under a
simple, one-step totality of the circumstances analysis, but it is asking
whether the policy the officer followed was reasonable. If the policy is
not reasonable, then the way that an entire department has been perform-
ing searches could be called into question.165 Of course, this raises a
question: if the Supreme Court was so intent on analyzing reasonable-
ness, why set up a complicated two-step analysis rather than look only at
the officer's actions? The answer is that the Court was trying to set up a
bright line rule, but failed.
166
The need for a clear bright line rule has not dissipated. The reason-
ing behind the "single familiar standard" advocated for in Lafayette, Ber-
tine, and Wells is sound and still present. 167 Bright line rules promote
efficiency. 168 More importantly, given that police are required to make
decisions under pressure and in potentially dangerous situations, bright
line rules help police determine in advance what decisions are legal and
what evidence they find will be upheld at trial. 69 Prosecutors must also
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987);
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. Clear rules are favored over subjective analysis in police procedure cases
because, in part, they establish limits that protect rights while also being easy to follow for those not
trained in the law. See LaFave, supra note 75. Professor LaFave also suggests the following:
Four questions ... should be put before any supposed 'bright line' rule is adopted by a
court: (1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes case-by-case
evaluation and adjudication unnecessary? (2) Does it produce results approximating those
which would be obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying principle
were practicable? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case application
of a principle because that approach has proved unworkable? (4) Is it not readily subject
to manipulation and abuse?
Id. at 325-26.
165. It should be noted that of the myriad of cases the author surveyed, very few courts actu-
ally found a police policy to be unreasonable when a policy existed at the time of the search. See,
e.g., Bertine, 479 U.S. 367; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); Opperman, 428 U.S. 364;
United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771 (8th
Cir. 2001); State v. Smith, 76 Wash. App. 9, 882 P.2d 190 (1994); People v. Benites, II Cal. Rptr.
2d 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). But see State v. Custer, 868 P.2d 1363 (Or. App. 1994).
166. See LaFave, supra note 75, for what makes a successful bright line rule.
167. See Hilliard, supra note 75.
168. Id. See also LaFave, supra note 75, at 325-26.
169. The Lafayette Court noted:
[lI]t would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to
make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched
... "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only lim-
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believe that their officers are making legal searches and that they will not
lose a case based on a technicality. 170 The current inventory search stan-
dard, as it has been developed by the Supreme Court, calls that belief
into question and thus should be changed.
IV. WASHINGTON'S APPROACH TO INVENTORY SEARCHES
While a federal standard based on the U.S. Constitution already ex-
ists for inventory searches, states are free to impose greater privacy re-
strictions based on their own laws.' 7 1 Washington has chosen to do
this. 172 This Part will discuss and analyze Washington's inventory search
rules as they have developed through two cases, State v. Houser'73 and
State v. Williams.174 It will then critique how the Washington standard
has been misapplied by a federal court in United States v. Wanless.
75
This Part will conclude by briefly examining how Washington's
approach has been refined through several more recent cases.
A. State v. Houser 176 Adopts the Opperman Policy,
But Modifies the Opperman Rule
The first Washington case to address inventory searches following
the announcement of Opperman was State v. Houser,177 which recog-
nized the Opperman rule but disposed with the two-step analysis and
instead focused entirely on the officer's actions in performing an inven-
tory search.178 In Houser, the defendant was pulled over for making an
improper turn.17 9 After some investigation it became clear that the
ited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests in-
volved in the specific circumstances they confront."
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458
(1981)).
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 768-69, 958 P.2d 982, 986 (1998) (where the
Washington Supreme Court imposed a greater standard than the U.S. Constitution required, based on
state law claims and describes other instances in which it has done so); Christenson, supra note 52,
at 793-94 (advocating that states can and should provide greater protections against container
searches through their own constitutions).
172. See, e.g., White, 135 Wash. 2d at 761, 958 P.2d at 982; State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d
733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v. Smith,
76 Wash. App. 9, 882 P.2d 190 (1994); State v. Mireles, 73 Wash. App. 605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994)
(all discussed infra this Part).
173.95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980).
174. 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
175. 882 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1989).
176. 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 154, 622 P.2d at 1225.
179. Id. at 145, 622 P.2d at 1221.
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defendant was driving without a valid license.' 80 The defendant was ar-
rested, and the officer made a discretionary decision to impound the car,
rather than allow one of the defendant's friends to retrieve it. 181 Prior to
impound, the officer performed an inventory search of the car which
included opening the locked trunk with the car's ignition key.182 Upon
doing so, the officer found some pills in a grocery bag and opened "a
closed toiletry bag which also contained drugs."'' 83 The defendant was
charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. 
84
The Washington Supreme Court held that the evidence should have
been suppressed, basing its decision on both the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7 of the Washington constitution.
85
In doing so, the court found the search invalid under the Opperman stan-
dard, although it misstated the Opperman rule saying, "The reasonable-
ness of [an inventory] search or seizure must be decided in light of the
facts and circumstances of the case."' 86 Under its Opperman analysis, the
Houser court believed the officer impounded the car for investigatory
purposes, in order to use the inventory search as a ruse to rummage for
evidence. 87 However, what is notable about this case is how the court
began to tweak the Opperman standard as it is applied in Washington.
The court abandoned the obnoxious and needlessly complicated two-step
approach of determining if police procedure was followed and then de-
termining whether that procedure was reasonable. 88 Instead, the court
stated that "a noninvestigatory inventory search .. is proper when con-
ducted in good faith" for the purposes of: (1) protecting the owner's
property from theft; and (2) protecting police from dishonest claims of
theft. 189 In essence, the court adopted the Opperman reasonableness ra-
tionale for police search policies as the test for searches while abandon-
ing the controversial "public danger" rationale.' 90
Overall, this general rule announced in Houser is better than the
federal rule announced in Opperman, because it simplifies the analysis.
However, the Houser rule is not perfect because it relies on a case-by-
180. Id. at 146,622 P.2d at 1221.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 147, 622 P.2d at 1221.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 145, 622 P.2d at 1220.
185. Id. at 147-48, 622 P.2d at 1222.
186. Id. at 148, 622 P.2d at 1222. In actuality, the Opperman rule merely requires that police
follow an established procedure that is found to be reasonable. See discussion supra.
187. Id. at 152, 622 P.2d at 1224.
188. Id. at 154, 622 P.2d at 1225.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Compare id., with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-74 (1976).
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case approach instead of a bright line rule. To that extent, the rule fo-
cuses solely on the officer's actions rather than on the policy the officer
followed. 191 If the U.S. Supreme Court is truly intent on analyzing inven-
tory searches under a reasonableness or totality of the circumstances
method then it should adopt an approach which focuses on the search
itself. However, the Houser approach is not a bright line, per se rule and
it does not exemplify a "single familiar standard" that is easy for police,
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys to apply.
192
Although the Washington Supreme Court adopted a modified ver-
sion of the Opperman reasonableness test in Houser, the court also began
to adopt bright line rules relating to scope and consent.19 3 Among these
was a rule that said searching a locked trunk was outside the scope of an
inventory search.19 4 The court believed that searching a locked trunk
would do little to accomplish the dual purposes of protecting the owner's
property and protecting the police from claims of theft. 195 That idea is
open to criticism because if police have a key to the trunk, it does not
protect them from dishonest claims of theft, even if they do not enter the
trunk. There is little to stop a defendant from claiming a dishonest cop
stole the gold bar he was keeping in his trunk, especially if the police
make no search or record of what was actually in that trunk. Addition-
ally, the trunk is not as secure as the Houser majority claimed.
96
Although "countless numbers of automobiles with locked trunks are
daily left on the city streets of this country. . . ," those same automobiles
are often burglarized. 197 The dissent picked up on this issue and criticized
the majority for limiting the inventory search from serving its intended
purposes. 
98
Additionally, the court adopted a bright line rule that prohibited the
police from opening a closed piece of luggage, like the toiletry bag,
without the owner's consent. 99 The court held, "[a]bsent exigent circum-
stances, a legitimate inventory search only calls for noting such an item
as a sealed unit."200 Although this rule is open to similar criticisms as the
rule prohibiting entry into a locked trunk, it is important for two reasons.
First, it represents a step in the direction of establishing a clear, uniform,
191. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d at 158-59, 622 P.2d at 1228.
192. See Hilliard, supra note 75. See also discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C, I.D, 1I1.B.
193. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d at 154, 622 P.2d at 1225.
194. Id. at 155-56, 622 P.2d at 1226-27.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 156, 622 P.2d at 1226.
198. Id. at 166, 622 P.2d at 1233 (Doran, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 158-59, 622 P.2d at 1227-28 (majority opinion).
200. Id. at 158, 622 P.2d at 1228.
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statewide system of bright line rules for police.0° Second, it indicates
that the court viewed consent, at this early date, as an important compo-
nent of an inventory search, even if only for containers.20 2
B. State v. Williams 20 3 Further Defines Washington's
Inventory Search Rules and Contemplates Consent
In State v. Williams, the court reaffirmed that inventory searches
must follow a valid impound to be lawful, and it further considered con-
sent as a requirement to an inventory search.204 In Williams, the defen-
dant was arrested in connection with a robbery. 205 At the time of his
arrest, the defendant had just pulled into his driveway; the police drove
by, saw the defendant sitting in his car and ordered him out.20 6 Believing
the robbery had just been committed and that evidence was close at hand,
the arresting officer performed what he termed an inventory search of the
defendant's car.207 The officer found jewelry from the robbery in the car
and immediately stopped the inventory search in order to wait for a war-
rant.20 8 After determining that the search was not valid as a Terry
209
stop,210 the court quickly dismissed the inventory search as not being per-
formed pursuant to a lawful impound.21 Notably, the court in Williams
did not analyze the inventory search issue in depth because its primary
focus was on the Terry issue.21 2 However, the court stated in dicta that "it
is doubtful that the police could have conducted a routine inventory
search without asking [the defendant] if he wanted one done. 21 3 The
dissent dismissed this claim as running counter to the goals of the inven-
tory search as described in Opperman.
214
201. Compare id., with State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984), and State
v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
202. See cases cited supra note 201.
203. 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065.
204. Id. at 742-43, 689 P.2d at 1070-71.
205. Id. at 734-35, 689 P.2d at 1066-67.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 735, 689 P.2d at 1067.
208. Id.
209. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police are entitled to briefly detain indi-
viduals for "investigatory stops" and, if necessitated by 'reasonable suspicion," perform a protec-
tive frisk of the suspect for weapons). Protective searches under the Terry doctrine were extended to
passenger compartments of automobiles in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
210. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 736-40, 689 P.2d at 1067-69.
211. Id. at 742-43, 689 P.2d at 1070-71.
212. Id.
213. Id at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071.
214. Id. at 747, 689 P.2d at 1073.
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This short statement that appears at the end of Williams has had a
great effect on the cases 215 that followed and will continue to do so. Al-
though it is dicta,216 this line indicated the court's interest in requiring
consent for inventory searches. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
this issue when it addressed Williams a few years later.27
C. The Ninth Circuit Misapplies the Williams Dicta
Five years after Williams was decided, a federal inventory search
case came to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which imposed consent
as a requirement for performing an inventory search in Washington.1 8 In
United States v. Wanless, two vehicles were pulled over by the Washing-
ton State Patrol.219 Since none of the people in the cars had driver's li-
censes, the investigating troopers called for a tow to have the vehicles
impounded.220 While waiting for the tow truck, the troopers inventoried
the vehicle, according to Washington State Patrol policy, and discovered
drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded handgun. 12 2 The Ninth Circuit,
for reasons that are not entirely clear, incorrectly stated that the troopers
were required to follow Washington law in performing their inventory
search as part of "standard procedures. 222 Then, the court erroneously
claimed that Washington law required the troopers to obtain consent be-
fore performing any inventory search.223 In doing so, the court relied
solely on the dicta contained in Williams as "Washington law as set forth
by the state's highest court.,224 Prior to Wanless, the only mention of
requiring consent in Washington for an inventory search, other than
when opening containers, 225 was in the Williams dicta. The Washington
State Patrol manual did not require the troopers to obtain consent, 226 and
the troopers were told to go ahead with the search after consulting with a
member of the Washington State Bar. 227 The dissent picked up on the
215. See, e.g., United States v. Wanless, 883 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1989); State v. White, 135
Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
216. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071.
217. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
218. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459.
219. Id. at 1460.
220. Id. at 1461.
221. Id. at 1461-62.
222. Id. at 1463. See discussion supra Part 11.
223. Wanless, 882 F.2d at 1463.
224. Id. at 1463-64. The court also relied on Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and
Seizure Law. 1988 Update, 11 U. PUGET SOUND (SEATTLE U.) L. REV. 411, 578 (1988); however,
that article in turn relied only on the dicta in Williams to claim that consent was required.
225. See discussion supra Part IV.A (of State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218
(1980)).
226. Wanless, 882 F.2d at 1468 (Wright, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1461 (majority opinion).
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majority's warped view of Washington law and harshly criticized it for
overstepping its bounds.228 While requiring consent or allowing suspects
to refuse searches is a lofty goal and the future of inventory search doc-
229trine, it is not the place for a federal appellate court to write Washing-
ton law. 230 Furthermore, as is apparent with the misapplication of the
Williams dicta in Wanless, federal appellate judges may not be as well-
versed in Washington constitutional law as a Washington Supreme Court
231Justice.
D. Washington Refines Its Approach to Consent
and the Scope of Inventory Searches
A few years after Wanless, the Washington Court of Appeals re-
fused to extend a consent requirement to inventory situations where the
car's owner was not present or where the searches are performed as part
of jail booking.23 2 In State v. Mireles, 233 the defendant's car was seized in
connection with a lien for unpaid child support.23 4 Upon a routine admin-
istrative inventory search, a worker with the Department of Social and
Health Services found a stash of cocaine.235 The court applied an analysis
similar to Houser236 and said that the defendant did not have the ability to
refuse the search merely because he was not present for the search.237
Thus, while not conclusively decided, consent is not a requirement in all
situations. Similarly, in State v. Smith,238 the Court of Appeals applied
the Houser analysis to the personal inventory search of a defendant's
purse upon jail booking and did not mention the issue of consent. 239 So,
consent is likely not required in booking situations either.
The Washington Supreme Court's most recent case involving in-
ventory searches is State v. White, decided in 1998, which reaffirmed the
Houser limitations on scope, yet refused to clearly adopt a consent re-
quirement. 24 In White, the defendant was stopped for running a stopsign; his car was impounded because he was driving with an expired
228. See id at 1467-69 (Wright, J., dissenting).
229. See discussion infra Part V.
230. See, e.g., Erie. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
231. See, e.g., Wanless, 882 F.2d at 1467-69.
232. State v. Mireles, 73 Wash. App. 605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994); State v. Smith, 76 Wash. App.
9, 882 P.2d 190 (1994).
233. 73 Wash. App. at 605, 871 P.2d at 162.
234. Id. at 608, 871 P.2d at 163.
235. Id.
236. See discussion supra Part IVA.
237. Mireles, 73 Wash. App. at 610-14, 871 P.2d at 164-67.
238. 76 Wash. App. 9, 882 P.2d 190 (1994).
239. Id. at 15-16, 882 P.2d at 194-95.
240. 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
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license.241 Under the police department's inventory search policy, the
officer was required to open the trunk if he had a key or if there was a
release latch in the passenger compartment.242 The trunk contained an
unlocked tackle box that contained drug paraphernalia, marijuana, co-
caine, and money.243 The White court maintained a bright line rule where
police could enter an unlocked glove box, but as in Houser, entry into a
locked trunk regardless of accessibility through a latch, was verboten.
244
Additionally, the court reaffirmed that police actions in Washington gen-
erally will be judged by the totality of the circumstances, without regard
to standardized procedure.245 Lastly, the issue of consent made another
appearance, once again in dicta.246 In a footnote, the majority said that
vehicle owners should be asked whether they consent to the inventory
search and be given the opportunity to reject it.247 In making this claim,
the court relied on both Williams and Wanless.
248
After White, Washingtonians are left with a two big questions.
First, although the issue has usually been relegated to discussion in dicta
and not conclusively decided, it seems that drivers have the ability to
refuse an inventory search in Washington.249 In fact, all U.S. citizens
may have this right.25° Unfortunately, neither a Washington court nor the
U.S. Supreme Court has ever addressed this issue directly and defini-
tively.25' Furthermore, it is unclear whether police must ask for consent
and under what circumstances, although the Washington Supreme Court
suggests that police must ask for consent in some situations.252 Second, it
remains to be seen whether the policy behind the inventory search is
being served by Washington's limited scope for inventory searches. As
the dissenters in White pointed out, there are some situations where a
would-be thief could get into a "locked" trunk or could access closed
253containers.
241. Id. at 764, 958 P.2d at 983.
242. Id. at 765, 958 P.2d at 984.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 766-68, 958 P.2d at 984-85.
245. "Further, compliance with established police procedures does not constitutionalize an
illegal search and will not enable police to search a locked trunk without a warrant." Id. at 771, 958
P.2d at 987.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 771 n.11,958 P.2d at 987.
248. Id.
249. See discussion of Williams and White, supra Parts IV.B, IV.D.
250. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 28, at § 7.4(a) (arguing that police must honor a driver's refusal
of an inventory search).
251. See discussion of Williams and White supra Parts IV.B, IV.D.
252. See discussion supra Part IV.
253. State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 775-76, 958 P.2d 982, 989-90 (1998).
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V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGING INVENTORY SEARCHES
IN WASHINGTON AND ACROSS THE NATION
Courts should establish a clear, simple standard that is easy to ap-
ply. Bright line rules that are easy to follow in the field should prevail
over a "reasonableness" analysis. This Part will discuss a two part pro-
posal to improve the inventory search doctrine. First, in order for inven-
tory searches to serve their intended purpose, the scope of the searches
should be broad, allowing police to search anywhere a potential thief
could go. Second, a consent requirement should be incorporated into the
procedure so civil liberties are adequately protected from such a broad
search. Given the complicated nature of the inventory search as it has
developed both nationally and in Washington over the last thirty years,
these improvements can make the doctrine serve its original goals.
The term "reasonableness" pervades judicial opinions on the Fourth
Amendment, perhaps because the word is raised by the Amendment it-
self 25 4 Abandoning the reasonableness, or case-by-case, approach would
mean abandoning the rule the Washington Supreme Court announced in
Houser255 and that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in Opperman
25 6
While this rule has been around for almost three decades, it is difficult to
apply 257 and is subject to abuse.258 However, police need to be able to
have a "single familiar standard" with which to guide their actions in an
often hectic environment.259 What follows is a two part proposal for just
such a standard.
A. Clearly Define the Proper Scope of an Inventory Search
The scope of the inventory search should allow police to search
trunks, glove compartments, and closed containers. Inventory searches
should not be extremely limited in scope because that would defeat the
purpose of the doctrine. Trunks, glove compartments, or closed contain-
ers should be fair game during an inventory search because a thief could
easily access those places. Officers should be limited, as the Douglas
County Sheriff's Office policy states, from damaging the vehicle by rip-
ping open the seats, door panels, and the like,260 but police should not be
prevented from searching any place a would-be thief could access. Cer-
tainly, this rule allows for wide latitude in officer discretion in deciding
254. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
255.95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980).
256. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
257. See discussion supra Part III.
258. See, e.g., Eismann, supra note 14.
259. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
260. See DOUGLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, supra note 6.
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where valuables are and what a thief might be able to get, and that was a
chief complaint of those who concurred in Bertine26t and Wells.262 Unfor-
tunately, police discretion with regard to scope can be hard to regulate,
and a toothless attempt at curtailing discretion in this instance would not
further the policy goals underlying the inventory search.
The purpose of the inventory search is to protect property from
theft and to protect police from claims of theft.263 This policy can hardly
be accomplished if law enforcement officials cannot search everywhere a
thief can. The biggest example of this comes from White,264 where the
Washington Supreme Court held that an officer cannot search a trunk,
even if it can be accessed through a release latch located inside the pas-
26senger compartment. 65 As the dissenters pointed out, if a thief can easily
reach a trunk in this manner, but the police cannot, then the inventory
search doctrine is pointless. 266 Additionally, a per se rule prohibiting
trunk searches creates a grey area with regard to hatchbacks, station
wagons, SUVs, and cars with fold-down rear seats. Is a trunk in such a
car ever considered locked? If it is, police are unable to search that area
under the current Washington rules, 267 although a thief can get to that
area.
The same policy goals of protection from theft and claims of theft
that exist with respect to trunks and glove compartments also apply to
containers because many valuables stored in containers are small in size
and easily accessible to thieves. If police are prohibited from searching
containers, then it would be easy for a person to claim that her diamond
engagement ring or Rolex watch was stolen, as these are small items that
could be hidden in just about any container. While some commentators
believe that containers should be off limits during an inventory search,268
container searches may well be necessary, especially if the container will
be left in the car while it is impounded. Of course, broad searches and
those that allow for officer discretion are troubling to those concerned
261. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A]bsence of
discretion ensures that inventory searches will not be used as a purposeful and general means of
discovering evidence of crime.").
262. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I cannot join the
majority opinion because it goes on to suggest that a State may adopt an inventory policy that vests
individual police officers with some discretion .... ").
263. Omitted is the third rationale, protecting the public from danger, as it has been signifi-
cantly discounted over time. See discussion supra Part l1I.A.
264. State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
265. Id. at 771, 958 P.2d at 987.
266. Id. at 775, 958 P.2d at 989 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 771, 958 P.2d at 987.
268. See Christenson, supra note 52.
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about civil liberties. 269 However, these broad inventory searches are in-
tended to protect property interests and are not designed to discover evi-
dence. In part, due to the diminished privacy interest citizens have in
their automobiles and, in part, due to the legitimacy of the policy inter-
ests underlying the doctrine, courts have determined that the safeguards
of a warrant are not required for an inventory search.27°
B. Imposing a Consent Requirement as a Safeguard
for a Broad Inventory Search Power
If such a broad inventory search power is to exist, a consent re-
quirement should and must be clearly incorporated into the inventory
search doctrine in order to protect people's privacy. Clear statewide or
nationwide safeguards should be adopted that, if violated, would result in
an inventory search being found per se unreasonable. In addition to con-
sent, some simple changes should be adopted, such as requiring police to
complete an inventory form every time they do an inventory search.
These reforms, taken as a whole, would protect privacy rights and allow
citizens, not police, to determine the limits of the search.271
Consent is easy to incorporate in those situations where the vehicle
owner or a driver is present.272 An officer performing a search should be
required to inform the occupants that she will be searching the car for
inventory purposes only and that the occupants have a right to refuse the
search. Warnings that inform people of their rights are not unheard of in
situations where there is no other way to adequately protect those
rights.273 While some might be concerned that warnings would result in
fewer prosecutions, the purpose of the inventory search is not to produce
269. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 75 (arguing, in part, that bright line rules should only be
used when they can effectively protect people's privacy); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("1 cannot join the majority opinion because it goes on to suggest that a
State may adopt an inventory policy that vests individual police officers with some discretion .... ");
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463-72 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing warrantless
searches should be limited in scope to the needs of the rationale that supports them and that bright
line rules are never justified on the basis of law enforcement efficiency).
270. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-73 (1976) (noting the dimin-
ished privacy interests in automobiles due to government regulation and frequent inspection and also
disfavoring the use of warrants due to the automobiles inherent mobility).
271. Despite that inventory search rules and policies should not limit the scope of inventory
searches so that the doctrine serves its intended policy goals, as discussed supra Part V.A, the scope
of a search should be able to be limited by consent, or lack of consent, in order to protect a person's
privacy. For instance, if a driver feels an inventory search is getting too intrusive, she should be able
to stop the search at any time.
272. See, e.g., State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998); State v. Williams, 102
Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State v. Mireles, 63 Wash. App. 605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994).
273. Such as in the case of a custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
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evidence of a crime.274 If the doctrine is invoked for that purpose, the
search is invalid.275
Unfortunately, verbal warnings about consent and refusal do not
work in situations where the vehicle's owner or driver is not present.276
Washington courts have already recognized this problem and have de-
277cided not to impose a consent requirement in these situations. When a
driver is not present, some other scheme should be established to alert
vehicle owners of the possibility of an inventory search. Possible solu-
tions could include prophylactic warnings in the driver's training manual
or signs near parking areas. Another approach would be an implied con-
sent rule for those who abandon vehicles in situations where they are
subject to impound. Implied consent rules already exist under drunken
driving statutes, where it is implied that those driving cars consent to a
blood, breath, or urine test and, if a person refuses, he is subject to a pen-
alty.278 While such a law should not apply to people who are present
when an inventory search is about to take place, passing a statute and
making it part of driver's education would put people on notice that
abandoning a car would subject it to an inventory search. None of these
solutions is perfect, but something is required to make the unidentifiable
driver aware of what is at stake.
Once a person has been notified of their ability to refuse an inven-
tory search, or even if they have not been, police should always honor a
person's refusal, absent exigent circumstances. However, following a
refusal, something must be done to satisfy the policy reasons behind the
inventory search. In other words, there must be a secondary procedure to
protect the police from dishonest claims of theft and to protect the vehi-
cle owner's property. By far, the simplest and most effective way to do
this is to require the subject to sign a release form. Under such a release,
the person would give up their right to bring claims against the govern-
ment for theft and they would assume the risk of any losses that might
occur as a result of the impound. Police already carry plenty of forms for
such things as issuing reports, traffic citations, and taking statements, and
citizens are frequently asked to sign police forms for incidents in which
they are involved.279 The introduction of a release agreement would not
274. See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 364.
275. Id.
276. Such as in Opperman, id, where the defendant's car was impounded for a parking viola-
tion.
277. See Mireles, 73 Wash. App. at 605, 871 P.2d at 162.
278. For a good example of an implied consent law, see WASH. REV. CODE. § 46.20.308
(2005).
279. See, e.g., SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at § 2.081 (describing the various
forms that are used by Seattle Police in traffic enforcement and when and how they are used).
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be overly burdensome as police are already required to carry and use
multiple forms for various traffic incidents.280
Obviously, these proposed changes cannot happen overnight. Ide-
ally, legislatures should make these changes to the inventory doctrine in
the form of statutes. Doing so would put people on notice that the poli-
cies and procedures established would be effective statewide instead of
changing from city to city or county to county. However, over the past
thirty years, legislatures as a whole have failed to address inventory
searches.28 1 Due to this lack of legislative action, courts have been forced
to impose their own rules, although some have been loathe to do so.28 2 If
courts continue to set inventory search policy, they should implement the
above reforms, especially those with regard to consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
283After thirty years, little has changed in inventory search doctrine.
Generally, inventory searches are upheld as valid if they are performed
according to a reasonable police procedure that protects the owner's
property from theft, protects the police from dishonest claims of theft,
and protects the public from harm.284 This rule is confusing, complicated,
and difficult to apply. Due to the demand for clarity, state courts have
started responding with their own rules.285 Washington has responded by
abandoning the focus on police department policy and by imposing some
bright line rules.286 Washington has even begun to incorporate consent as
280. See id.
281. Some legislatures have addressed search and seizure procedures generally. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to 16-3-405 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 933.01 to 933.40
(West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-1 to 17-5-56 (West 2006); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725 §§
5/108-1 to 5/108-14 (West 2006); IOWA CODE §§ 808.1 to 808.14 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
22-2501 to 22-2530 (2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 626.04 to 626.22 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
542.266 to 542.301 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-241 to 15A-259 (West 2001); VA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 19.2-52 to 19.2-60 (West 2006).
282. One court noted the following:
Like the Supreme Court of the United States, we are a judicial, not a legislative body. It is
not our function to decide as a matter of policy how, and for what purpose, automobiles
or other private property that come into official custody should be examined. That is a
matter for politically accountable officials to decide by laws, ordinances, or delegations
of rulemaking authority.
State v. Atkinson, 688 P.2d 832, 835 (Or. 1984). In reality, courts do decide law as a matter of pol-
icy, especially in inventory search cases.
283. Compare South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), with State v. White, 135
Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
284. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987);
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 364.
285. See, e.g., discussion supra Part IV.
286. See, e.g., White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982.
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a necessary component of inventory searches. Bright line rules requir-
ing consent and defining the scope of the search are the future of this
doctrine. To ensure that inventory searches continue to serve their useful,
intended purpose for the next thirty years, courts should broaden the
scope of inventory searches to allow police to search wherever a thief
could and require police to obtain consent for inventory searches where
the driver is present.
287. See, e.g., idat 771 n.l 1,958 P.2d at 987.
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